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Abstract 
The right to ‘voice’ has been identified as central in enabling agency and in 
ensuring human dignity. This paper discusses an understanding of ‘voice’ which 
has been derived from Charles Taylor’s concept of ‘strong evaluation’. Voice, 
from this perspective, is found within an ongoing process of identity 
development which is based on a quest for an authentic sense of self 
embedded in a moral journey. It is argued here that strong evaluation offers a 
new perspective within qualitative inquiry and emancipatory practice which 
may support agency and recovery in those affected by mental health issues. At 
the same time, strong evaluation offers the potential for positive self-
transformation to all those involved in research or practice – either as service 
users or as service providers/researchers.  The paper addresses how strong 
evaluation may be enhanced and extended by sociological understandings. 
This is discussed in relation to a study on the changing discursive landscape in 
the field of mental health.  Despite its primary focus on mental health, this 
paper is relevant to researchers working within a range of marginalized 
communities whose members lack epistemological authority.  
2 
 
 
Key words: Emancipatory practice, qualitative methodology, Charles Taylor, 
mental health, marginalization, recovery, identity, voice 
Introduction  
Members of socially disadvantaged groups (generally often those commonly 
labelled ‘vulnerable’) struggle to be heard. As a result, their marginalization 
can become more entrenched, often with very serious consequences. Multiple 
historical and contemporary examples can be drawn on to show how the 
‘silencing’ of the voices of the marginalized leads to infringements of human 
rights, sometimes with life threatening consequences (see Fisher 2012). Take, 
for example, the revelations of the criminal abuse of patients at Winterbourne 
View, a private hospital in the UK registered to provide assessment, treatment 
and rehabilitation for people with learning disabilities and autism (DH, 2012). 
Similar themes emerged with the publication of the Francis (2013) Report 
which exposed a culture of neglect in the Mid Stafford NHS (National Health 
Service) Trust, which had resulted in the appalling suffering and the 
unnecessary deaths of many older people. The fact that children are at risk of 
abuse in schools, clubs and care homes has equally been the focus of extensive 
media attention in the UK in  2013 (see, for example, Morris, 2013). 
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The starting point for this paper, which focuses specifically on people with 
mental health problems, is that wherever the voices of the marginalized are 
‘silenced’, patterns of oppression emerge and persist. People with mental 
health problems are arguably amongst the most excluded members, 
constituting a residual category even among marginalized groups (Freshwater 
2003). As Radden (2012 p.3) explains,  
The mad have been excluded from the epistemic as well as the social 
community, their voices disregarded and dismissed as meaningless. 
Their struggle must include being believed as credible knowers, as well 
as being merely heard. 
  
In this paper, our attention is directed towards considering an approach to 
voice which could be applied in emancipatory research and practice in the field 
of mental health, where therapeutic practice has sometimes been identified as 
contributing to the problem of exclusion (see for example, Bertram & Stickley 
2005; Freshwater & Cahill, 2010; Freshwater & Holloway, 2010). Our 
perspective on voice is developed by drawing on the thinking of the moral 
philosopher Charles Taylor (1989) in his seminal work Sources of the Self.  
Whilst this approach shares some of the methodological techniques associated 
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with poststructuralism and constructivism, its ontology is realist; the 
significance of the realist ontology is considered at various points in the paper.  
 
The paper addresses how strong evaluation could be used to overcome the 
sometimes unequal relationships which can be associated with the notion of 
‘giving voice’. We see identifying an encounter as ‘giving voice’ in research or 
practice (or labeling a research participant as ‘vulnerable’) as a form of 
external and arbitrary labeling which potentially closes down the agency 
required for self-transformation (Fisher 2012).  This is a view we have gradually 
arrived at through our professional and academic experience. Pamela Fisher is 
a sociologist with an interest in issues of ‘vulnerability’ and ‘resilience’ among 
marginalized communities, including families with children with disabilities 
(Fisher 2008), people with mental health problems (Fisher and Freshwater, 
2013), stigmatized political groups (Fisher 2005), and professional identities 
(Fisher and Byrne 2013). Dawn Freshwater has extensive professional 
experience of mental health nursing and psychotherapy underpinned by 
substantial research experience in these areas. Sharing our different 
disciplinary backgrounds, we have developed a particular interest in how 
people’s internal lifeworlds intermesh with the external world.  Much of our 
work previous emphasizes the emancipatory potential of poststructuralist 
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analysis and of narrative approaches within a constructivist paradigm. Our 
more recent interest in Charles Taylor’s (1989) strong evaluation can be 
regarded as an extension of our interest in poststructuralism and 
constructivism, although it is ontologically and philosophically quite distinct 
from these.  
  
Our second aim is to suggest that Taylor’s moral philosophy sits comfortably 
with sociological theories which interrogate unequal social relations. Put 
differently, we advocate the blurring of the boundaries between moral 
philosophy and sociological theory. In the paper’s second half, the role of 
sociological theory in unmasking unequal relations is discussed with regard to 
the changing discursive landscape of mental health (Crossley & Crossley 2001). 
We suggest that if sociological interrogation is incorporated into Taylor’s 
understanding of strong evaluation, the latter may become more powerful and 
potentially more emancipatory in its effects.    
 
While our discussion focuses primarily on the example of people marginalized 
by mental health issues, we anticipate that our discussion will be relevant to 
diverse researchers and to a range of disadvantaged communities whose 
members lack epistemological legitimacy.  Our starting point is that Charles 
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Taylor’s understanding of strong evaluation potentially offers opportunities for 
members of marginalized groups to present their often silenced (sometimes 
through the internalization of oppressive discourses) perspectives whilst 
enabling personal growth towards an authentic sense of self. The notion of the 
authentic self is central to understanding Taylor’s (1989) strong evaluation. 
According to Taylor  (1989),  each  person has a distinct way of being  human, 
and everybody should be encouraged to grow towards their true self rather 
than to conform to any blueprint imposed from outside. From this perspective, 
the goal of any research or therapeutic encounter should be the mutual 
transformation of all parties involved. In relation to mental health, the focus 
would no longer be specifically on the pathology of one of the interlocutors.   
 
This paper is organized as follows. We begin with a brief discussion of the 
changing discursive landscape in the field of mental health. Subsequently we 
provide an overview of Taylor’s (1989) concept of strong evaluation, 
considering it in relation to poststructuralist and constructivist perspectives.  
This is followed by a discussion of how Taylor’s strong evaluation resonates 
with recent social scientific perspectives which have challenged traditional 
fact/value and reason/emotion dichotomies. The second half of the paper 
focuses specifically on a study of mental health (Crossley & Crossley, 2001) in 
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order to demonstrate the utility of sociological theory to emancipatory 
practice and research.  It is concluded that emancipatory practice and research 
in mental health might be served by approaches informed by strong evaluation 
which incorporates sociological analysis.  
 
Emancipatory approaches within mental health 
In Medicine diagnostic categories are defined in terms of cultural norms and 
values.  This is particularly the case in mental health where disorders are 
enmeshed with issues of personhood and social integration.  Mental problems 
raise questions about responsibility and blame, reflecting a wider cultural 
tendency to differentiate between blameless misfortune and problems 
incurred as a result of agency (Miresco and Kirmayer  2006). Writing of the 
plight of people diagnosed with mental health problems, Radden (2012, p.3) 
explains, ‘Their struggle must include being believed as credible knowers, as 
well as being merely heard’. In this context, emancipatory inquiry and practice 
may open up possibilities for the construction of alternative understandings by 
positioning people as experts in their own lives and experiences, thereby 
enabling them to create a meaningful narrative and regain control of their 
lives. We acknowledge the work of Romme and Escher (1993, 2000) and 
Romme et al. (2009), which provided the inspiration for the Hearing Voices 
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Network which has been influential in inspiring mental health care that places 
people’s accounts at the center of therapeutic interventions (Place et al. 2011). 
As a result, voices ‘in the head’ are no longer necessarily dismissed as irrational 
but are now sometimes interpreted as articulating, on a metaphorical level, 
meaningful life experiences.  Nevertheless, we remain concerned that ways of 
conceiving mental illness, which are enabling in nature, may perpetrate 
oppressive understandings which continue to be applied in research and 
therapy in ways that can restrict understandings of recovery (see Bertam and 
Stickley 2005). Although policy guidance has now replaced old discourses of 
deficiency with the language of ‘recovery’ (see DH 2009; DH 2011), 
understandings of recovery are operationalized in differing ways (Bonney and 
Stickley, 2008). There is a danger of imposing a template of recovery which 
reduces interpretations to a dominant understanding of recovery.  
 
Giving voice? 
Narrative studies in mental health have movingly illuminated the direct and 
largely unmediated experiences of people grappling with mental health 
problems (see for example Grant, 2006, Short et al. 2007). While these 
testimonies provide valuable insights into the daily indignities and forms of 
oppression which are experienced by people diagnosed as mentally ill, there is 
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a risk that they can contribute to ‘fixing’ people within situations of despair. 
McRobbie (2002), for example, has argued that testimonies of suffering can 
naturalize rather than combat the social sources of the suffering, thereby 
undermining the potential for agency. Agency is often prompted by political 
awareness and, in the field of mental health, studies based on poststructuralist 
discourse analysis have made significant challenges to the power-base of 
medical knowledge, reinstating people with mental health problems as 
instigators of change (see, for example, Crossley & Crossley 2001, Freshwater 
2007, Hui and Stickley 2007, Zeeman and Simons 2011, Fisher and Freshwater 
2013). These studies reveal how meanings are constructed in discourse and 
stories, and how these challenge ‘legitimate’ institutionalized forms of 
knowledge which perpetuate oppression. Nevertheless, despite a development 
towards interdisciplinary collaboration, the medical model maintains a 
powerful grip in the field of mental health. This is manifest in particular by a 
persistent emphasis on diagnosis. As Freshwater et al (2013: 4) put it, 
‘…diagnosis underpins every aspect of a patient’s therapeutic journey and sets 
the parameters of their mental illness…so in this sense, the patient’s mental 
illness, through diagnosis, is literally written into existence.’ In some cases 
professionals drawn from diverse disciplinary backgrounds appear to collude in 
the perpetration of psychiatric discourses. What this means in practice is that 
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diagnosis is sometimes used to silence and to dismiss certain dimensions of an 
individual’s identity which might otherwise be drawn on in order to contribute 
to the capacity for recovery. Freshwater et al. (2013) have termed this type of 
collaboration ‘dysfunctional consonance’.  We believe that Taylor’s notion of 
strong evaluation may be useful in combating the limits which diagnostic 
labeling can place on a person’s potential for self-development. 
 
 In the second part of this paper, a study on mental health by Crossley & 
Crossley (2001) is discussed in order to demonstrate the value of sociological 
analysis in reinforcing strong evaluation.  Through a sociological lens, the plight 
of people with mental health problems shifts from a position of individual 
tragedy to one of social or political resistance. We argue that the social and 
political dimensions informing the discourses which contribute to personal 
subjectivities should be included alongside personal concerns into the 
processes of strong evaluation. Personal transformation does not take place in 
a vacuum, but is aligned to processes of social change.  
 
Before addressing the sociological and political dimensions of mental health, 
the paper begins by outlining some of the main tenets of strong evaluation 
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which, we suggest, may be of value in research and in practice encounters that 
seek to be emancipatory.  
 
What is strong evaluation? 
 In common with constructivist and poststructuralist approaches, strong 
evaluation maintains an emphasis on language whilst simultaneously 
remaining attached to a realist ontology. Taylor (1989) is interested in realities 
which extend beyond individual experiences and perceptions, but recognizes 
that people’s ability to exercise agency in shaping their identities (in ways 
which are authentic to them) are significantly constrained by the available 
discursive templates.   
 
According to Taylor (1989) a main purpose in life should be to move towards 
one’s authentic self through striving towards greater understanding of deeper 
realities. While we cannot understand the full nature of these realities, 
achieving greater proximity to them is associated with human flourishing.  
From this perspective, the deeper reality constitutes an aspirational horizon 
rather than an attainable goal; what matters is that people strive towards a 
more proximate understanding of what that deeper reality may be.  To seek 
greater understanding of the deeper realities is essentially a quest to 
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contribute to higher levels of human flourishing. Engaging in this quest 
provides meaning within people’s lives, and this is essential to human 
wellbeing.  Greater proximity to the deeper realities is achievable through the 
pursuit of scientific, experiential or cultural knowledge. In fact, Taylor refuses 
to distinguish between objectivism and relativism, insisting that science is not 
capable of providing an exhaustive account of entities in the world. Differing 
approaches are legitimate for investigating the complexity of the natural world 
and the complexities of human existence.   
 
Taylor places a high value on convictions and identifications. As Taylor (1989 p. 
34) points out, in identifying with a certain end, a person comes to define 
herself by it and if she subsequently abandons this end, it causes her 
existential pain.  Crucially, however, whilst convictions and identifications 
provide a frame of reference they should nevertheless be accompanied by an 
understanding that they constitute a ‘work in progress’  -  or the best that has 
been achieved so far. In other words, personal values are to be cherished but 
with the caveat that they should also be seen as revisable and therefore 
provisional. The values that people hold dear should, for Taylor (1989), be 
regarded as important and yet transitory products that emerge through a 
never-ending process of identity construction. Some may counter that this a 
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problematic stance, but it is one which is typical of Taylor who challenges some 
of the traditional binaries of the social sciences: openness/criticality, 
reason/emotion, fact/value, and objectivity/subjectivity.  
 
Taylor would therefore reject the view that professionalism should be 
associated with a rationalist-instrumentalist mindset, preferably 
uncontaminated by emotion or value-judgment.  Seen from Taylor’s 
perspective, the mental health professional should have an emotional 
attachment to their work which extends beyond task-based competency or 
compliance with organizational requirements. Further, if strong evaluation 
were incorporated into therapeutic or research practice, it would open up the 
potential for positive transformation of the researcher/practitioner as well as 
for the people they encounter who have a diagnosis of mental illness. This said, 
an approach informed by strong evaluation would lack the hyperflexibility of 
some postmodern approaches as it would necessarily maintain the connection 
to an ethical responsibility embedded in a realist ontology. This would place 
significant demands on practitioners/researchers in their encounters with 
people with mental health problems: on the one hand, 
practitioners/researchers would be required to maintain ‘deep toleration’ for 
others’ values (which may seem ‘alien’) whilst continuing to cherish their own 
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values. Indeed, strong evaluation is only viable if it is based on a bedrock of 
existing values, otherwise there is nothing to evaluate. Crucially, however, the 
convictions and identifications of both parties would be subject to strong 
evaluation. From this perspective, the goal would no longer be to ‘cure’ the 
‘patient’ but to engage in a process (strong evaluation) leading to mutual 
transformation.  Strong evaluation is premised on a relationship of parity; we 
suggest that this fundamentally democratic position may be more important in 
relation to recovery in mental health than is generally acknowledged.    
 
An arguably controversial point, particularly in mental health, is that Taylor 
contends that strong evaluation requires authentic engagement with others. 
What this means is practice is that whenever people identify values or rights 
which they regard as helpful to themselves, they have a responsibility to make 
these accessible to others. This is a position which could be objected to on a 
number of grounds; it might understandably raise concerns about the potential 
for the proselytization of inappropriate perspectives. What, for example, is to 
prevent someone from expressing the view (in an encounter with a person 
with mental health problems) that recovery from mental health is not possible 
or even that people with  mental health problems are not worthy of care? We 
can partially respond to this by reminding the reader that strong evaluation 
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necessarily involves an openness and an acknowledgement that cherished 
values cannot constitute the ‘last word’, but simply reflect the results of our 
best efforts to date.  At the same time, Taylor (1989) argues that strong 
evaluation should begin with ‘hypergoods’, which are higher order goods 
which offer a standpoint from which judgments about other goods become 
possible. Hypergoods are arrived at through the process of strong evaluation 
which has taken place at individual and societal levels. In contemporary liberal 
societies, Taylor identifies autonomy, universal justice and the minimization of 
suffering as hypergoods.  These hypergoods should provide a starting point for 
strong evaluation.   
 
It may be objected that definitions of human flourishing and ideas of how to 
enact hypergoods will vary immensely, and we acknowledge this difficulty 
which does not appear to be clarified in Sources of the Self. Nevertheless, our 
professional and academic experience leads us to believe that most people 
working in mental health, either as researchers or practitioners, would support 
the view that autonomy, justice and the minimization of suffering are values 
which should provide a moral compass in their work. That said, oppressive 
practices persist, often despite the best of intentions.  Taylor would no doubt 
16 
 
 
counter that the best of intentions should themselves be the subject of 
ongoing strong evaluation. Complacency is not an option.    
 
Why strong evaluation matters? 
Taylor’s conceptualization of strong evaluation resonates with some of the 
philosophical thinking of Iris Murdoch. In the introduction to Murdoch’s, novel  
A Word Child, Monk (2002) suggests that Murdoch is advocating the need for a 
balance between the creative powers of language and an acknowledgement of 
a reality beyond it.  This is at the heart of Murdoch’s philosophy; she feels that 
people need to believe in goodness as an externally existing entity otherwise 
all that remains is the word ‘good’, which on its own provides no guidance or 
inspiration (Monk, 2002). The struggle towards good, a characteristic of so 
many of Murdoch’s novels, appears to be close to Taylor’s (1989) argument 
that strong evaluation must be orientated towards a moral vision. For 
Murdoch as well, motivation and agency require a frame of horizon that 
creates meaning in people’s lives, otherwise,  
[People] lack a frame or horizon within which things can take on a stable 
significance, within which some life possibilities can be seen as good or 
meaningful, others as bad or trivial. The meaning of all these possibilities 
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is unfixed, labile, or undetermined.  This is a painful and frightening 
experience (Taylor 1989 pp. 27-28).  
What this means is that without a frame of reference, people have no starting 
point for considering their commitments and values – and perhaps no moral 
obligation to reflect critically on these either.  This may undermine the agency 
and motivation required for personal and social transformation.  A similar 
point is made powerfully in Viktor Frankl’s (2006) study Man’s Search for 
Meaning relating to his personal experience of the Holocaust. In this work, 
Frank testifies that resilience is associated with a strong sense of purpose, 
attached to a moral framework which transcends a narrow focus on the self.  
The greatest task for anyone is to find meaning in their life. Poignantly 
describing his personal experiences of Nazi death camps, Frankl’s (p.77) 
position appears close to strong evaluation when he writes, 
      We had to learn… that it did not really matter what we expected from 
            life, but rather what life expected from us. We needed…to think of 
            ourselves as those who were being questioned by life - daily and 
            hourly…  Life ultimately means taking the responsibility to find the 
            right answer to its problems and to fulfil the tasks which it constantly 
           sets for each individual. 
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We suggest that strong evaluation can provide the impetus to search for 
meaning in life. As previously discussed, the moral framework is not a fixed 
one, but one should nevertheless act as an aspiration - it is precisely this search 
for an external good or deeper reality which facilitates human flourishing.  The 
search may be undertaken by drawing on constructivist and poststructuralist 
approaches, but strong evaluation demands more than this. It also requires 
that people engage in a quest to connect with their authentic self through 
engaging in a search for deeper meaning. It is precisely this quest towards 
meaning which is associated with resilience in the face of adversity, such as 
mental illness. 
 
Strong evaluation and the social sciences 
As  previously mentioned, the second aim of this paper is to demonstrate how 
strong evaluation can articulate with sociological perspectives, despite the fact 
that the social sciences have often tended to regard values as subjective and 
therefore beyond the scope of legitimate social inquiry. The dichotomy which 
has separated facts from values is now being contested by some social 
scientists who argue that values are necessarily integral to social science. 
People should be seen as meaning-endowing agents whose values are arrived 
at through cognitively and emotionally informed processes (Bolton 2000, Lewis 
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2005, Deery & Fisher 2010, Fisher & Byrne 2012).  Sayer (2010 p. 5) has 
provided a rational for this, arguing that values can be regarded as 
‘sedimented’ valuations that have been integrated into dispositions.  
They merge into emotional dispositions and inform the evaluations that 
we make of particular thing, as part of our conceptual and affective 
apparatus […]. The relation between values and particular valuations is 
thus recursive. 
The dialectical relationship between more abstract values and concrete 
valuations, and the view that these are underpinned by cognitive and affective 
dimensions, is rarely acknowledged within institutional contexts (Fineman 
2000; McDonald, 2004; Hughes, 2005; Lewis 2005; Deery & Fisher 2010). In 
this paper, we question the value/fact and emotion/reason dichotomies that 
have sometimes characterized institutionalized knowledge in the field of 
mental health.  
 
Strong evaluation and a sociological perspective  
In this section of the paper we consider how horizons of meaning in mental 
health have been shaped. We suggest that strong evaluation applied within 
mental health will be enacted with greater success if underpinned by an 
awareness of the social and institutional contexts – in particular, how the latter 
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shape the availability of narrative resources.   In other words, strong evaluation 
may usefully incorporate the sociological imagination.  Below we consider a 
study by Crossley & Crossley (2001) which combines a poststructuralist analysis 
whilst also drawing on the theory of Bourdieu. The study relates to the 
historical development of narrative resources shaping the field of mental 
health.   
 
Habitus 
Bourdieu (1984) developed the concept of habitus to refer to a person’s 
embodied dispositions, tastes and ways of doing things. It therefore concerns 
about what they feel comfortable or uncomfortable with, and how this 
conducts them to do the things they do. Habitus formation is pivotal to the 
flow of a person’s life and will influence behavior, aspirations and thinking. 
Habitus is always situated and shaped within specific ‘fields’, meaning within 
sites of practice, which are characterized by interdependency, competition and 
power between specific individuals and groups. Fields incorporate innumerable 
forms of human endeavour, for instance law, teaching, mental health, chess, 
football or floristry. Participation in a field entails tacit acceptance of its 
arbitrary goals, values and rules. Although fields are discrete, they overlap, and 
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they shape the habitus of the actors within them. To a significant extent, fields 
determine people’s actions, behavior, hopes, wishes and ways of thinking.  
 
Narrative habitus (Frank 2010), meaning the repertoire of stories accessible to 
a person, can limit aspirational horizons, particularly those of people who 
suffer from stigmatization and marginalization. Unfortunately, when a person 
has been socialized within a field associated with social disadvantage they tend 
to develop a habitus that is adapted to the restrictions of their lives as they see 
other possibilities as unobtainable. This was illustrated, for example, in Willis’s 
(1977) seminal work, Learning to Labour, in which he demonstrates how in the 
1970s working class boys restricted their employment aspirations to unskilled 
manual work.  As this study demonstrates, people make tacit decisions as to 
whether a story speaks to them personally or whether a story represents a 
world in which they have no stake.  This is based on an often intuitive and 
embodied sense that ‘some story is for us or not for us’ (Frank 2010 p. 53).  In 
other words, once incorporated into the narrative habitus, stories give a sense 
of life’s potentialities.  
 
Transformation of habitus 
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The work of Bourdieu is often interpreted as focusing narrowly on how 
societies and agents are reproduced, ignoring the ways in which they can be 
transformed. Crossley & Crossley (2001), however, have integrated Bourdieu’s 
notion of habitus with a poststructuralist perspective which demonstrates how 
an awakening and a motivation to resist psychic violence emerged within the 
field of mental health. Identifying mental health movements as part of  
broader civil rights movements, and therefore akin to feminism and post 
colonialism, Crossley & Crossley (2001) suggest that habitus is transformed in a 
process of struggle, which they define as a struggle against oppressive external 
forces as well the oppressive workings of one’s own habitus.  
 
In Crossley & Crossley’s study (2001), the transformation of habitus is 
discussed in relation to a poststructuralist analysis of two texts: The Plea for 
the Silent and Speaking our Minds.   The former, which dates back to the 
1950s, is atypical of its time in the sense that it provides patients in mental 
hospitals with an opportunity to ‘speak out’ about their experiences. 
Nevertheless, the testimonies of individualized suffering and personal 
indignation which characterize The Plea for the Silent are of their time in the 
sense that the narrators view their plight as individual tragedies.  This is very 
different from the assertive voices in the 1990s study Speaking our Minds, 
23 
 
 
which reveals service users (no longer patients) self-identifying as members of 
oppressed groups (for example on the basis of gender, race, sexual abuse) and 
as survivors of the mental health system.  Whilst patient accounts of the 1950s 
seek to establish a discursive distinction between themselves and other 
patients (whom they identified as genuinely ‘insane’), the service users of the 
1990s see themselves as engaged within a political struggle.  Crossley & 
Crossley (2001) argue that the different discursive positions adopted in the 
1950s and 1990s are related to a transformation of habitus from one of 
victimhood to one of resistance. The transformation of habitus arose as a 
consequence of a shift in perspectives, whereby oppression came to be seen as   
a collective, system-based phenomenon. This is discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
Recovery: a more amenable climate for authenticity? 
According to Crossley & Crossley (2001) significant transformations have 
occurred in the field of mental health in response to, in the first instance, the 
impact of the anti-psychiatry movement whose adherents, including  R.D. 
Laing, called for the wider public to listen to and to try to understand 
‘madness’ from the perspectives of those labeled as mad. A key argument was 
that behaviors and experiences of mental illness are often more 
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understandable when their context is taken into account.  While the anti-
psychiatry movement remained largely under the control of professionals, it 
nevertheless instigated a discussion based on a different framework for 
interpreting mental illness which could be subsequently adopted by service 
users. However, as Crossley & Crossley (2001) point out, patient resistance in 
mental health did not emerge solely out of the field itself; the impetus for it 
was fuelled by the transposition of a resistance habitus from other fields such 
as feminism and black liberation. Emancipatory messages crossed from one 
seemingly specific and localized struggle within one field to another field, 
igniting struggle across a range of social justice issues (Crossley & Crossley 
2001). 
The field of mental health now clearly incorporates narrative resources of 
recovery which extend beyond the medical model. At its most emancipatory, 
recovery is conceptualized as derived from hope, connection and healing.  This 
perspective is based on a rejection of the view that the symptoms of mental 
illness are definitive of one’s identity.  This can mean, for example, that a 
fulfilling, meaningful and satisfying life does not necessarily require the 
eradication of all symptoms; indeed, even situations of crisis may have 
empowering dimensions (Bradstreet & Connor 2005). Such a view opens up 
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possibilities for innumerable and diverse stories of recovery that may or may 
not involve the restitution of ‘normality’. 
The development of a habitus of resistance through the transformation of 
narrative resources is not an easy process.  Biomedical discourses on mental 
health may have ceded some ground but even today they continue to buttress 
the dominant status of the medical model (Mancini 2007; Powers 2007). A 
further aspect to this is that medical practice (and corresponding technologies 
of diagnostic assessment and intervention) are deeply rooted in specific 
cultural concepts of ‘the person’ which are characteristic of western 
individualism related to economic autonomy (Rose 1999). Although the impact 
of complex material and environmental factors on mental health is recognized 
in policy, this sits somewhat uneasily in policy documents which continue to 
emphasize the fiscal burden of mental health and discourses of 
responsibilization. Rather tellingly, in No health without mental health, 
recovery is described as ‘central to our economic success and interdependent 
with our success in improving education, training and employment 
outcomes…’ (DH 2011 pp. 2-3). While presented in an ostensibly inclusive 
discourse embedded in the idea of the ‘Big Society’, the Department of Health 
can be seen as perpetuating an economic narrative which devalues people 
who are not assimilated into the assumptions of modern capitalism. As Spivak 
26 
 
 
(2010 p. 110) argues, ‘to be deemed unproductive according to the dictates of 
advanced capitalism, is indeed part of what marks the subaltern as subaltern’.  
 
The ‘evangelical’ support for self-care (Rogers et al., 2009) may have been 
instigated by user movements but it has also been sequestered within policy 
makers who draw on it to endorse liberal and neo-liberal perspectives 
associated with the dominant model of western personhood – the rational 
economic actor (Barchard 2005).  This can lead to a focus on relapse 
prevention and on eradicating symptoms which could otherwise be regarded 
as meaningful. Beyond this, however, the dominant view of personhood 
delegitimizes those who operate within alternative ‘circuits of value’ (Skeggs 
2011). Such a limitation is, of course, incompatible with Taylor’s (1989) 
understanding of the quest for the authentic self. 
 
As suggested by Crossley & Crossley (2001), the field of mental health is a 
highly complex one in which competing discourses wrestle for influence within 
an intricate and multi-layered discursive landscape. Transformations have 
clearly provided the necessary resources for the development of a habitus of 
resistance and emancipatory restorying, but discourses of individual deficiency 
persist.  Furthermore, the adoption of recovery as a key concept within mental 
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health should be viewed with a critical eye. In some cases, this may be 
interpreted as based on a binary opposition dividing service users into two 
categories; those who are able and willing to ‘recover’ (and are therefore 
compliant with normative citizenship) and those who pose a risk to society. 
Whilst policy documents, for example, New Horizons: a shared vision for 
Mental Health (DH  2009) and No Health without Mental Health (DH 2011), 
employ the language of ‘recovery’ this does not necessarily imply the 
encouragement of diverse quests towards recovery.  
 
What we draw from our discussion of Crossley & Crossley (2001) is that an 
encounter within mental health informed by strong evaluation might usefully 
include a political and sociological interrogation of the political and discursive 
constraints and opportunities which impact on people’s frames of reference. 
Seeing the role of the researcher or practitioner as in some sense political may 
superficially evoke Foucault’s (1980 p.128) notion of the ‘specific intellectual’. 
For Foucault, a specific intellectual uses their knowledge and competence 
within the field of a political struggle. There is, however, a fundamental 
difference in orientation between the position occupied by the ‘specific 
intellectual’ and that of the practitioner or researcher who seeks to embrace 
strong evaluation.  Foucault’s conception of a ‘specific intellectual’ is not based 
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on an assumption of parity: on the contrary, it is incumbent on the ‘specific 
intellectuals’ to open up new conceptual vistas to others, who are tacitly 
positioned as less enlightened.  Put differently, the specific intellectuals are not 
open to their own transformation. Power inequalities are maintained.  
 
Some concluding thoughts 
In our concluding comments, we begin by considering the paper’s second aim 
which was to demonstrate the value of integrating a sociological lens into 
strong evaluation.  Drawing on Crossley & Crossley (2001) we have suggested 
that mental health and social functioning are significantly shaped by social and 
political issues, and that the exercise of power is key to this. The processes of 
identity reconstruction or recovery in mental health must be enacted in a 
complex field characterized by complex webs of power. What comes to be 
considered ‘normal’ functioning may be shaped by dominant discourses which 
are interwoven with constructions of normative citizenship. Nevertheless, the 
distribution of power shifts in response to emancipatory struggles which can 
be transferred across different fields of human activity.  A sociological 
imagination therefore instigates challenges to ‘common sense’ thinking which 
may perpetuate oppressive understandings. Sociological thinking, by throwing 
a critical lens onto social relations, can usefully inform and reinforce the 
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processes of strong evaluation which aim towards the development of an 
authentic sense of self embedded in a deeper reality.  
 
The first aim of this paper was to suggest that emancipatory practice and 
research work within the field of mental health might usefully incorporate 
strong evaluation into research and practice. We acknowledge that with its 
emphasis on cherished values, strong evaluation may seem ‘at odds’ with 
radical openness. Some may object that openness cannot be maintained in the 
face of strongly held values and that strong evaluation could result in an abuse 
of power, particularly when working with ‘vulnerable’ groups. Whilst 
recognizing this perspective, we would add that all social encounters have the 
potential to perpetuate circuits of symbolic violence (Rabinov 1977).  
Importantly, however, Taylor’s thinking is based on a refusal of ‘either/or’ 
binaries which are characteristic of the certainties of the modern mind in 
western society. Researchers or practitioners engaging in strong evaluation 
must necessarily embark on a process of ‘unlearning’ their privileged position, 
and accepting that their encounters with patients or research participants 
should lead to mutual personal growth. What strong evaluation offers is an 
aspiration towards future personal development on the basis of relationships 
of parity. Returning to the issue of ‘voice’, strong evaluation is very much 
30 
 
 
about voice but not in a way that fixes people according to diagnostic 
categories. On the contrary, strong evaluation challenges dominant frames of 
reference which deny the value of alterity – particularly in relation to recovery.  
  
While strong evaluation shares some of the emancipatory techniques 
associated with constructivism and poststructuralism, its realist ontology 
encourages the quest for an authentic sense of self and aspirations towards a 
moral vision beyond subjective preferences. We consider this important in 
prompting recovery in mental health.  Our professional and research 
experience in mental health suggests to us that those who appear to hold few 
values beyond their own narrow interest tend to flourish less well than others. 
Equally, in our own lives, we have noted how an orientation to others’ 
wellbeing and/or meaningful work can be helpful in overcoming personal 
adversity.  Perhaps most importantly, strong evaluation offers a vantage point 
from which everyone’s journey towards developing their sense of self is seen 
as unique. The power of externally imposed templates is therefore reduced. In 
relation to mental health, strong evaluation entails envisioning recovery as a 
journey which is distinctive and authentic for each individual.  
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